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"Give Me a Break!" Emerson on Fruit and Flowers 
GARY SHAPIRO 
University of Richmond 
"Give me a break!" This expression appears to be an imperative or a request. 
In colloquial English, it can be either, or it can be uttered with various 
degrees of irony as a complaint, an objection, or a reproof. I want to begin by 
considering it in a relatively serious way, by asking what it means to ask some-
one to give, and to give a break. According to some analyses in a certain dis-
course on the gift (for example, in Nietzsche, Bataille, Levinas, and Derrida), 
the gift is always a break of some sort. It is an interruption, an excess, an incal-
culable intervention. It breaks with a circle or cycle of economic exchange, of 
debt and credit. A true gift (to borrow one of Emerson's terms) cannot be one 
that was anticipated or one for which return is expected. In one sense, then, 
reading very literally, "give me a break" is a tautology, for it says "give me a 
gift," where the gift is understood as rupture and disruption. Or perhaps the 
break requested is for me, for the speaker of the phrase, who asks for special 
consideration; while it may be recognized that there are a set of laws or rules in 
place that all are expected to follow, the speaker appeals to his or her special 
circumstances, including perhaps a relation to the one addressed. So it can be-
come a demand for justice, for that absolutely unique justice that escapes rule 
and law. More specifically, in terms of common usage, the expression is fre-
quently a request for time, for freedom from some constraints or expectations, 
possibly a petition to be released from a deadline, or from some constrictive 
schedule. It asks for a break in time, a break from or interruption in a rigorous 
agenda; it asks for something like an intercalary day, as in the time given at New 
Year's in Babylon when there was a festive day that did not appear on the calen-
dar, but that was understood to be available for camivalesque reversals of and 
variations on normative social codes. The gift and time-these two themes come 
together in recent texts such as Derrida's Given Time (1992), but also in Ralph 
Waldo Emerson's essay "Gifts" (see Emerson 1990), which I propose to read. 
"Give me a break," then, seems to encapsulate much of what current thought 
has to say about the gift. And yet, if we now attend to the phrase as request or 
demand, rather than to its presumed object, the break, it begins to seem not 
tautologous, but self-contradictory, for surely there is something deeply prob-
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lematic about asking for or demanding a gift. If the gift, including the gift of 
time, is something that I have come to expect, to see as my due, then it cannot be 
the gift as such, it cannot be a break with the economic norm. At the extreme, 
"Give me what you owe me (and you owe me a break)" would seem to involve 
a sense of give that has very little to do with the gift as unmotivated excess. Yet 
the usage of the phrase can sometimes encompass this analysis in ironic fash 
ion. It asks, speaking from weariness and frustration, Why should I have to ask 
you for a break? Why should it be my responsibility to articulate that which you 
should have come to by yourself? Why must we now be talking of the gift and 
giving, when such talk must necessarily involve a lapse from the level of the gift 
to that of the conventional economy? The gift cannot be anticipated discursively. 
It might be saying something to this effect: If what we are doing, exchanging 
services, paying debts, making sure that everything circulates smoothly, is giv 
ing, then I don't want anything. Give me nothing! And yet, giving me nothing, 
letting me off, giving me time just might be the real gift. 
Emerson's "Gifts" is a short essay that might seem to be quite innocent of the 
sort of analysis to which I have been alluding. A recent and celebrated intellec 
tual biography of Emerson describes it as one of several "light, short pieces" 
(Richardson 1995, 400). Yet Emerson placed it in the center of his Essays: Sec 
ond Series (1990). Debts to Emerson and to this essay in particular are acknowl 
edged by Nietzsche1 and Marcel Mauss (1990, 65). To the extent that Emerson 
has an image in poststructuralist thought, it is probably not as a radical thinker, 
but as an idiosyncratic and eclectic American with a homiletic style and an aver 
sion to asking the most penetrating questions; Emerson might be perceived as a 
kindly sage, revered for a wisdom that will never cause great discomfort. How 
ever, I want to suggest that Nietzsche and Mauss were right in honoring Emerson 
and that a reading of "Gifts" will confirm the validity of their designating him 
as their predecessor, for Emerson thinks the break. 
Emerson articulates what later appears as a crucial theme in Heidegger, 
Bataille, Levinas, and Derrida: the gift, or the true gift, as he calls it, is exces 
sive and perhaps transgressive with respect to the law. The gift, I will argue, 
emerges as that which marks a rupture with the law, and this rupture is suffi 
cient to displace and unsettle a number of assumptions concerning community, 
communication, friendship, and what might be called (in several senses) the 
hermeneutics of the present. If Emerson is not the first in whom we might find 
such a view, we will find it developed in "Gifts," an essay that seems at first to 
deal only with the commonplaces of manners and etiquette, with what might be 
called a remarkable economy. If Emerson can sound like Miss Manners when 
he writes that "Flowers and fruits are always fit presents," the insight takes on 
another cast when we read it, as we should, against the background of Kantian 
aesthetics. 
I would like to begin with the first sentence of "Gifts," which is not strictly 
speaking the essay's first sentence, for like so many of Emerson's essays this 
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one is preceded or framed by one of his poems, and the poem is clearly con 
cerned with the gift both as a sign or form of friendship and as the excess that 
can signal friendship's end. 
Gifts of one who loved me? 
'T was high time they came; 
When he ceased to love me, 
Time they stopped for shame. 
(1990, 303) 
The time of the gift is announced here, and questions of time and history will 
haunt this essay as will the complex of the gift, love, and the cessation of love. 
The poem sounds like a personal statement; it seems to tell a little story, in 
which the speaker says that his gifts from the other, the former friend or lover, 
never came quite at the right time, but were too late or too early. How does one 
time a gift; how can we be sure that the gift arrives at the right moment? Already 
in this poem we can see a double reading of "give me a break!" or of the gift as 
break. The gift is to be a sheer interruption, an intervention; it is also to be what 
is fully and continuously present, which marks a break with sequential, linear 
time. 
As Emerson will observe later, "The only gift is a portion of thyself," and his 
first example will be "Therefore the poet brings his poem." So does the essayist 
bring his essay, and "Gifts" is a brief interruption that is placed squarely in the 
middle of the second series of essays; it names those essays and itself while 
meditating on the very possibility of the gift. Such gifts, "portions," or sacri 
fices of the donor, if there are any, would restore society "to the primary basis, 
when a man's biography is conveyed in his gift." But the gift that the poet 
(Emerson) brings here is one that tells us precisely of the failure of the gift (that 
is, the gift given to the speaker) to arrive on time or at the right time. The poem 
is a gift that hints at the impossibility of the gift by its story of disappointment 
and its elegiac tone.2 
What I would like to call the first sentence of the essay, as well as what 
follows, seems to refer us to other issues about time. Emerson begins, after the 
framing poem, by recounting something that is said, but without attributing the 
source: "It is said that the world is in a state of bankruptcy; that the world owes 
the world more than the world can pay, and ought to go into chancery and be 
sold." We will want to ask who makes this claim that the world is broke, that it 
teeters on the edge of a catastrophic run on the bank. And does Emerson endorse 
this? Certainly, it is commonplace in any society that operates on credit, and we 
can think here of the arguments concerning the state of the debt, the balancing 
of the budget, or the future of social security in any advanced capitalist society 
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such as the United States. The sentence also conjures up the paradox of the 
world being sold at auction, an impossible sale because there are no buyers 
outside the world who might bid on it. Where are the limits of the economy? 
What is the law of debt and repayment here? And who might have said such a 
thing? Let me suggest that we can read this "it is said" as an allusion to the 
putative first sentence of Western philosophy, a sentence that, by coming at the 
beginning, helps to constitute the structure within which all thinking about 
economy takes place. It is the sentence attributed to Anaximander, which in its 
typical translation reads something like this: "Whence things have their origin, 
there they must also pass away according to necessity; for they must pay pen 
alty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time" (see 
Heidegger 1984, 13; see also Kirk and Raven 1962, 117-18).3 In this usual 
reading, Anaximander would be expounding a law of universal indebtedness, a 
law that would be the law of time itself. Everything that comes to be would from 
the very start owe a debt simply for having come into being, a debt that could be 
repaid only by its ceasing to be. To use up time, to linger, to verweilen (or to 
while away time) is to exist on credit; however, all debts will eventually fall 
due. Nietzsche sees this principle as foundational for Western philosophy, when 
in his essay on Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, he claims that 
Schopenhauer, his immediate predecessor, has said essentially the same thing 
and attempts to establish that philosophy has said the same thing from 
Anaximander to Schopenhauer (1962, 45). While Nietzsche will call this idea 
madness in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1985), Emerson will simply leave it as 
something that is said, without endorsing or rejecting it. 
After what I read as an allusion to the madness or, in any case, the beginning 
of philosophy, Emerson passes on, in his apparently blithe way, to the most 
immediate questions of gift-giving in its everydayness; he reminds us of the 
difficulty we might feel, for example, in finding an appropriate gift for the holi 
days or to bring home from our travels: "I do not think this general insolvency, 
which involves in some sort all the population, to be the reason of the difficulty 
experienced at Christmas and New Year and other times in bestowing gifts; 
since it is always so pleasant to be generous, though very vexatious to pay debts" 
(1990, 305). The question of universal debt is bracketed. Or at least it seems to 
be, for if something like Anaximander's principle obtains, then the world is not 
arranged so as to promote generosity. The point had been made earlier, in "Com 
pensation" (see Emerson 1990). The laws of the world are said always to re 
quire that any natural gift be compensated for by a corresponding defect. After 
pages of examples drawn from folk wisdom, observations of the animal king 
dom, legend, and literature, Emerson formulates the position rather generally: 
"There is a crack in everything God has made. It would seem, there is always 
this vindictive circumstance stealing in at unawares, even into the wild poesy in 
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which the human fancy attempted to make bold holiday, and to shake itself free 
of the old laws,?this back-stroke, this kick of the gun, certifying that the law is 
fatal: that in nature nothing can be given, all things are sold" (62). "The law is 
fatal." I take that to mean, first, that the law of compensation is fated; there is no 
escape from Nemesis and the Furies, as Emerson will say in the next lines. 
Second, it is fatal in the sense of death-dealing, for that is the ultimate end to 
which these various forms of recompense and retribution tend. Even "wild 
poesy"?Emerson has just cited the fates of Prometheus, Achilles, Siegfried, 
and others?must come back to the themes of mortality and punishment when 
dealing with heroes and gods whom we thoughtlessly imagine to be beyond 
reach of the law. If the gods do not suffer death, they can be sentenced to its 
closest approximation, eternal punishment. 
If this is what nature imposes, we may be left wondering whether individual 
gift-giving can be comprehended independently of the general economy. Our 
attention is directed to the ordinary, even banal, occasions of giving and the 
difficulties they entail. While generosity ought to be pleasant, "the impediment 
lies in the choosing," in our own failure to find just the right thing and our 
hesitation, indecision, or anguish over that. Indeed, Emerson here writes in the 
first person, confessing that he is "puzzled what to give, until the opportunity is 
gone." It's not just the gift but the timing of the gift that is crucial. An opportu 
nity appears, because of the fatality of the calendar, or for some unusual occa 
sion, or because it just seems like the right thing to do at the time. It is at this 
point that Emerson begins to muse on various alternatives and offers, it seems, 
a bit of advice to the shopper?or is it a meditation informed by Kantian aes 
thetics??"Flowers and fruits are always fit presents; flowers, because they are 
a proud assertion that a ray of beauty outvalues all the values of the world . . . 
they are like music out of a workhouse" (1990, 305). Kant was fond of the 
flower as an exemplar of natural beauty; we also know, as did Emerson, that he 
was outraged by the song that issued from the local workhouse and that he wrote 
letters to put an end to it. Emerson's taste is more tolerant; he finds the idea of 
music coming from a workhouse to illustrate something very much like Kant's 
conception of beauty as emerging from a world of necessity while remaining 
enigmatically consistent with it. 
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant's lists of things that we find beautiful in 
variably begin with flowers. There are at least seven such lists of objects that 
please us without our having to ask for anything.4 Flowers?at least some that 
we are expected to call to mind?are incontestable examples of natural beauty. 
Thus, they give a rhetorical weight to these lists, which sometimes move from 
the natural to the artistic, including landscape gardening and carpets with ara 
besque patterns; note that many of these are variations on floral patterns. (It 
might be interesting to know something about the state of horticulture in 
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K?nigsberg, and whether Kant ever saw any wildflowers?are there such??as 
opposed to illustrations of them.) The flower is always at the head of the list 
because it is meaningless; it breaks with sense. As Kant says, "Flowers, free 
designs, lines aimlessly intertwined and called foliage: these have no signifi 
cance, depend on no determinate concept, and yet we like them" (Kant A 207; 
1987,49). Flowers are fit gifts because they are already natural gifts; insofar as 
they transcend mere law, they are excessive and supplementary, thereby mark 
ing a break with what would otherwise be the uninterrupted reign of mecha 
nism. What we want in a gift, both as givers and as receivers, is a break from the 
law, so what better gift than that which is already a break? Always at the begin 
ning of the Kantian list, the flower is that uncanny thing that suggests meaning 
while denying it. For a flower to be beautiful, it must be singular and it must be 
given. To explain why "All tulips are beautiful" is not to give a judgment of 
taste; Kant contrasts it with another judgment "by which I find a singular given 
(gegebene) tulip beautiful" (A 285; 1987, 148). Should we hear the es gibt in 
this gegebene! Is it only the singular, that which exceeds or teeters on the verge 
of sense, that can be given? 
Flowers also mark a break, as Kant emphasizes, with significance. We find 
them beautiful only upon reflection, independently of any given concept. Emerson 
notes the departure from natural law when he writes, "Nature does not cocker 
us; we are children, not pets; she is not fond; everything is dealt to us without 
fear or favor, after severe universal laws. Yet these delicate flowers look like the 
frolic and interference of love and beauty" (1990, 305). "Nature does not cocker 
us": we are not pampered spaniels. Nevertheless we sometimes have experi 
ences that give the appearance of "the frolic and interference of love and beauty"; 
and this may be one of the senses of the longing that can be expressed by "give 
me a break!" which begs for "interference" and interruption. At least this is 
what we want in a true gift, a term that Emerson will introduce later to designate 
the gift as such, as opposed to the profane or banal gift that answers merely to 
necessity or, worse, to prevailing social expectations. I read "frolic" as Emerson's 
version of Kant's "free play," with a bit of joy or Lust added in that might have 
caught Nietzsche's attention. Elsewhere (in the essay "Politics") Emerson de 
scribes the presence of the wise man as a present of flowers: "His relation to 
men is angelic; his memory is myrrh to them; his presence, frankincense and 
flowers" (338). As angelic, he is a message without a meaning, and so we can 
rejoice and frolic in and with him. 
What would the world be like without a break from nature's "severe univer 
sal laws"? It would be a place, as Kant tells us, where there was no difference 
between human action and feeling and the coldest mechanism. Kant's first quali 
fication to this picture of the world is, of course, his idea that our moral au 
tonomy helps us escape from these external strictures; yet the moral law im 
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poses an imperative that is even more powerful because it is our own and comes 
from the depths of our being. That there should be natural gifts, that is, such 
things as beauty and sublimity is both a wonder in itself and a sign that the two 
realms of law are not simply opposed to one another. Yet when it comes to the 
question of the gifts that we give and receive among ourselves, Emerson seems 
to think that here, too, there are traces of the moral law that render the activity 
problematic. I take him to be following Kant in suggesting that the existence of 
the moral law is not a sufficient counterweight, for he says that we need some 
relief from "the law of benefits," the law that makes giving and receiving diffi 
cult. A preliminary statement of that law is "The law of benefits is a difficult 
channel, which requires careful sailing, or rude boats. It is not the office of a 
man to receive gifts. How dare you give them? We wish to be self-sustained. We 
do not quite forgive a giver. The hand that feeds us is in some danger of being 
bitten" (306). My autonomy seems to require that I be "self-sustained"; so I will 
tend to be suspicious of gifts, that is, of services or favors that are not required 
by the moral law. If they come from nature, like flowers, or from art, which 
offers its simulacra of the floral to everyone, I can muse upon them as the sym 
bols of a deeper unity in things than is evident from the two domains of theoreti 
cal and practical reason. 
Flowers might be exemplary, then, not only because they are nature's origi 
nal gift, an excess in relation to her (always "her") laws, but also because they 
suggest a certain way in which a recipient can understand himself or herself, a 
kind of "careful sailing" through that channel of the law of benefits. If you give 
me flowers, you may remind me of the gift that is given to all of us, rather than 
forcing me to think of your motive in choosing this or that object and to ask 
myself what you want of me. It is not that such concerns will necessarily be 
totally absent in the case of the gift of flowers; but this present offers one possi 
bility of our engaging in an activity of exchange that, like all exchange, must 
come under the authority of the moral law, and our sometimes jealous concern 
for our own autonomy, as if it were really in the domain of the aesthetic. At least 
that is what I take Emerson to be hinting in this passage that speaks of the hints 
of nature: "Men use to tell us that we love flattery even though we are not de 
ceived by it, because it shows that we are important enough to be courted. Some 
thing like that pleasure the flowers give us: what am I to whom these sweet hints 
are addressed?" (305). There is in the case of flowers a possibility of evading 
the calculation that always threatens to subordinate the gift to an economy of 
exchange. As natural gift, flowers are already given and so are eminently givable. 
Insofar as we are addressed by them, they flatter us without deceiving, or, as 
Kant said, they exhibit purposiveness without purpose. They are "sweet hints," 
aspects of a flirtation that seems to be going on between us and nature. The one 
who gives us flowers may indeed be courting us, but it is also possible that we 
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will be provoked to wonder about the much larger question of why nature courts 
us. We know that flowers are the product of "severe universal laws," yet they 
flatter us by suggesting that we have a higher destination than merely enacting 
those laws ourselves. We (should we read this as "we men"?) are "important 
enough to be courted" (could this mean that even we men are courtable, as if it 
went without saying that women are?). As Emerson later begins to spell out the 
difficulties of the "law of benefits," one of the major problems is that of address. 
I may feel as if a gift fails to take account of who I am; or I may recoil by being 
given something that shows that the sender has read me all too well. Gift-giving 
risks undermining the masks that are necessary for our self-protection. The gift 
of flowers raises a question: "What am I to whom these sweet hints are ad 
dressed?" The gift is a break that puts us into question; when flowers are ad 
dressed to me, I ask not just who I am, but what I am. Who is relevant in the 
calculating law of benefits. What does it mean to receive a gift of rollerblading 
equipment or Judith Krantz's latest novel or handcuffs or a Mont Blanc pen? 
This question initiates a hermeneutics of the gift: What could he or she have 
been thinking of? Am I known not at all or all too well? Who am I that you have 
characterized by your gift? What am I, such that I can appreciate the excessive, 
supplementary beauty of the flower? The recipient of this gift is a being for 
whom its being is a question, a question that ideally should take us beyond the 
more mundane casuistry of the law of benefits. 
Fruits are treated as slightly less exemplary of the gift than flowers: "Fruits 
are acceptable gifts, because they are the flower of commodities, and admit of 
fantastic values being attached to them" (Emerson 1990, 305). They are "ac 
ceptable," I take it, in a double sense: there is nothing objectionable about giv 
ing them (as there is about jewelry, for example) and they are worthy of accep 
tance by the one to whom they are given. The second sense is perhaps the root of 
the first, for only that which I can accept without reservations can be an accept 
able present for you to give. As a commodity, fruit is useful, it can satisfy that 
most primitive desire of hunger. And yet it exhibits those colors, shapes, tastes, 
and textures in their natural state (or in the cultivated state we call natural in 
distinction to more mechanical modes of production) that make them appeal to 
the senses. (If we were to follow the dialogue with Kant here more closely, we 
would have to interrogate his traditional distinction between the theoretical senses 
and others that would exclude even the fragrance of flowers from the aesthetic 
realm.) We might think of the European still life, especially those great Dutch 
paintings of the seventeenth century that glory in the spectacle of radiant fruit, 
with their partially peeled lemons. So far Emerson continues to work within the 
framework of a generalized Kantian aesthetics. The gift is the beautiful: unsought, 
purely emergent, and adventitious with respect to all necessities. But, as with 
Kant, especially the Kant who emerges in Jean-Frangois Lyotard's reading, these 
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gifts of flowers and fruit are to be seen as provocations, as breaks, events, or 
phrases that call for further phrases from us?not counter-gifts, but explorations 
of what we are (Lyotard 1994). 
What Emerson does not say specifically about flowers and fruit is that they 
are ephemeral gifts; they will last only a few days. Flowers and fruit are present, 
presents that remind us of the vanishing quality of the present. They celebrate 
the time of blossoming, flourishing, and ripeness. They are a gift of time pre 
cisely because they evoke an awareness of their own brevity. Thus, the flower 
especially becomes a privileged poetic figure because it ties together beauty, the 
gift, temporality, and hints of mortality. And just because of their fleeting char 
acter, flowers and fruit have an advantage over more lasting gifts, such as those 
of jewels and precious metals, which Emerson will soon discuss. Since they 
disappear naturally, the recipient has no responsibility to preserve them past 
their wilting or overripeness; the recipient cannot be expected to display them 
indefinitely or to pass them on to another. While it is possible to keep pressed 
flowers, there is also the sense that there is something excessive about this prac 
tice. Flowers are not like those hideous presents from your relatives that you 
must store away in the attic and bring out, dust off, and put up on the shelf when 
they come to visit. The other side to the transitory character of flowers and fruit 
is that they must be cut, picked, or plucked; like their painted counterparts in 
still lifes, they are not presented in their presumed natural state. They are given 
as broken, their giving is marked by a break; they can be present only in their 
enforced transience. 
Emerson distinguishes fruit and flowers from "common gifts." The latter are 
not to be despised; they are least taxing when they indeed answer to a specific 
lack: "For common gifts, necessity makes pertinences and beauty every day, 
and one is glad when an imperative leaves him no option; since if the man at the 
door have no shoes, you have not to consider whether you could procure him a 
paint-box" (1990, 305). Here we are in the realm of the ethical. The other stands 
before us in need and an "imperative" dictates that we fill that need. Posing the 
alternative as shoes versus a paint-box deftly emphasizes the contrast between 
two kinds of gifts, the utilitarian and the aesthetic. Here "Necessity does every 
thing well," the necessity that flows from the ethical imperative, an imperative 
that goes beyond Kant in a Levinasian direction: "In our condition of universal 
dependence it seems heroic to let the petitioner be the judge of his necessity, and 
to give all that is asked, though at great inconvenience. If it be a fantastic desire, 
it is better to leave to others the office of punishing him" (306). To be in the 
position of receiving is once more marked as dangerous. "Common gifts," then, 
are not true gifts, insofar as they respond to a specifically ethical imperative and 
may put the recipient at risk. 
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Is any gift other than flowers and fruit possible? (And let us not forget that 
even these must be given in a certain spirit.) Again, Emerson provisionally in 
troduces a rule or principle by attributing it to another: "Next to things of neces 
sity, the rule for a gift, which one of my friends prescribed, is that we might 
convey to some person that which properly belonged to his character, and was 
easily associated with him in thought" (306). This is, perhaps, the norm, the 
goal we have in mind when we prowl through the mall or the department store. 
But it is also the situation arousing that abyss of indecision that Emerson had 
begun by evoking: "The impediment lies in the choosing." What will she really 
think of this scarf? Is it too tame, too flashy, too expensive? Is a book too imper 
sonal? Sometimes we arrive at the right thing by some inspiration. But it's at 
this point that we may be tempted to fall back upon the lowest common denomi 
nator: jewelry, that which might seem to be rather like flowers, insofar as it 
appears destined to be a gift. What else can it be for, other than presentation and 
display? 
Like flowers, gold seems to be self-giving; it radiates. But Emerson rejects 
such an account of the general suitability of precious metals or jewels: 
[0]ur tokens of compliment and love are for the most part barbarous. Rings 
and other jewels are not gifts, but apologies for gifts ... it is a cold lifeless 
business when you go to the shops to buy me something which does not repre 
sent your life and talents, but a goldsmith's. This is fit for kings, and rich men 
who represent kings, and a false state of property, to make presents of gold 
and silver stuffs, as a kind of symbolical sin-offering, or payment of black 
mail. (306) 
In rejecting conventional gifts of "gold and silver stuffs," Emerson formulates 
the principle cited earlier: "The only gift is a portion of thyself. Thou must bleed 
for me" (306). And this bleeding contrasts with the "symbolical sin-offering" 
constituted by the jewels bestowed by the rich.5 There is a disjunction between 
the organic and the inorganic, one that was heralded by the introduction of flow 
ers and fruit. The theme of bodily sacrifice emerges, the idea that a "true gift" 
would be the result of a wound, a sacrifice of love. And by the end of the essay, 
we will apparently be told that gifts are possible only through love. But what 
has happened, then, to the rule prescribed by the unknown friend, according to 
which the gift must match the recipient? Does this mean that the gift must show 
that there is an attunement, an affinity, a merger between what is given and the 
recipient?in other words, that there is no break between them? Let us call the 
suggestion that one must give something authentically one's own the biographi 
cal principle. This principle in turn can be seen as one constituent of a natural 
economy, which Emerson describes in this way : 
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[T]he poet brings his poem; the shepherd, his lamb; the farmer, corn; the miner, 
a gem; the sailor, coral and shells; the painter, his picture; the girl, a handker 
chief of her own sewing. This is right and pleasing, for it restores society in so 
far to the primary basis, when a man's biography is conveyed in his gift, and 
every man's wealth is an index of his merit. (1990, 306) 
In this sense, Emerson, the poet and essayist, offers gifts by means of "Gifts." 
Or is it too easy to give of oneself in this sense? Shouldn't the genuine gift be 
one that, as the friend suggests, is appropriate for the recipient? Is the "primary 
basis" sketched here perhaps not so much a context for the gift, the excessive, 
supplementary gift, as it is the outline of an economy of exchange, an aesthetic 
socialism of the sort that attracted so many nineteenth-century thinkers, in which 
there would be a seamless and spontaneous system of productivity and circula 
tion? Ideally, giving of oneself would coincide with giving the other what is best 
for her or what pleases her. From each according to her ability to each according 
to her desire. James Joyce, during the period of his own aesthetic socialism, 
writes to Nora Barnacle of the necklace he's had made for her; there is an in 
scribed pendant that reads on one side "Love is unhappy" and on the other "When 
love is away" (1975,167-68). It is a line from one of his poems, so he combines 
the poet's art with the giving of gold or silver. As Emerson defines the true gift, 
"The gift, to be true, must be the flowing of the giver unto me, correspondent to 
my flowing unto him" (1990, 307). This flowing, this correspondence would 
seem to eliminate any gap or discontinuity. To give a break would then be to 
efface or eliminate any break. Does this risk reducing the gift to an economy of 
presence, as Derrida suggests of Heidegger's meditation on Anaximander (1994, 
27)? Or does Emerson's appeal to a natural, archaic economy function ironi 
cally in order to suggest the impossibility of the gift, given the mythical and 
idealized character of the archaic? We might think of this flowing and corre 
sponding in connection with the bleeding already invoked when Emerson says 
to the giver, "Thou must bleed for me." Flowing and corresponding would elimi 
nate all breaks; what's yours is mine, and the examples of flagons of oil or other 
liquids to which Emerson appeals are significant insofar as they come from the 
realm of that which does not come in discretely measured units, but which can 
be poured out and distributed continuously. However, to bleed for another is to 
suffer a wound or a break. It is even said that those who share the same blood, 
the members of a family, cannot strictly give to one another because they are 
already one in some sense. Furthermore, there is much anthropological testi 
mony that gift exchange is often seen as the literal or metaphorical transmission 
of bodily fluids; we might wonder what happens to the idea of the gift in a 
culture that sets itself the goal of prohibiting or radically restricting such trans 
mission. 
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"Gifts," then, can be read as a meditation on the impossibility of the gift. It's 
all downhill from fruit and flowers. Mauss observes in his citation of Emerson 
that "[t]he unreciprocated gift still makes the person who has accepted it infe 
rior_We are still in the field of Germanic morality when we recall the curious 
essay by Emerson entitled 'Gifts'" (1990, 65). Nietzsche excavates that world 
of Germanic morality in On the Genealogy of Morals (1989), where debt and 
credit rule and there are terrible penalties for refusing to pay. Was it that world 
of Germanic morality that Heidegger was attempting to erase with all of his 
readings of es gibt! The structure of Emerson's essay might indicate this. After 
allowing for the possibility of gifts of fruit and flowers, Emerson proceeds, as 
we have seen, to evoke the idea of a primary economy; however, he does this 
only to contrast it with the actual world in which false gifts of gold and silver 
misrepresent both giver and recipient. He continues by exploring the difficulty 
of receiving in a passage already quoted, where he says that "[i]t is not the office 
of a man to receive gifts." 
Emerson sometimes appears to be a cheery sage, a Taoist touched by classi 
cal American optimism. When he writes "He is a good man who can receive a 
gift well," we may be tempted to suppose that there are such good men?and it 
is overwhelmingly "men" not "women" or even "people" that appear in this 
essay?and that we could be among them. But the sentences that follow make 
this reading very doubtful: 
We are either glad or sorry at a gift, and both emotions are unbecoming. Some 
violence I think is done, some degradation borne, when I rejoice or grieve at a 
gift. I am sorry when my independence is invaded, or when a gift comes from 
such as do not know my spirit, and so the act is not supported; and if the gift 
pleases me overmuch, then I should be ashamed that the donor should read my 
heart, and see that I love his commodity, and not him. (307) 
So it is not only the donor who must have no expectations with regard to the 
gift, who must withdraw from all hopes and anticipations of effects and return; 
the recipient is in an equally difficult situation, for what was supposed to be a 
break with the usual economy renders him more vulnerable than before. Now 
the recipient must guard against his heart being read. "Give me a break" can 
sometimes mean "don't give me any gifts." Give me a break from the cycle of 
expectations; give me some time; let me be the one to offer, provoke, tease, or 
change the rules of the game. 
You cannot give me anything from friendship, Emerson says, because friends 
have everything in common: "How can you give me this pot of oil or this flagon 
of wine when all your oil and wine is mine, which belief of mine this gift seems 
to deny?" (307). To think of it as a gift is to bring into question a relation in 
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which we are gifts for one another. "This giving is flat usurpation," Emerson 
remarks, noting its turn into its apparent opposite. 
In the last two paragraphs of "Gifts," Emerson sums up the analyses that we 
have been following. He writes: "The reason of these discords I conceive to be 
that there is no commensurability between a man and any gift" (307). The law 
of the gift, then, is discord and incommensurability. And yet, if there were a gift 
that did not involve discord and incommensurability, would it be a true gift! 
Without such breaks, the gift would seem to amount to giving what is due, not 
with the supplementary and excessive. Emerson seems to say as much when he 
concludes the penultimate paragraph by suggesting that his critique of the gift 
so far applies only to planned, deliberate, calculative giving, a giving that must 
be undermined by the failure of all commensurability. We can at best give indi 
rectly, perhaps unconsciously, by what he calls an "oblique" stroke: "[W]e sel 
dom have the satisfaction of yielding a direct benefit which is directly received. 
But rectitude scatters favors on every side without knowing it, and receives with 
wonder the thanks of all people" (308). While Emerson at first calls this possi 
bility or condition of the gift rectitude, a word that sounds odd here, as if there 
were some right standard to meet, his last paragraph calls the gift-giving virtue 
"the majesty of love, which is the genius and god of gifts, and to whom we must 
not affect to prescribe." How are we to understand love here? Let us read the 
concluding lines of "Gifts" in which, not so surprisingly, love and its absence 
are described in terms of how they deal with flowers and fruit. Speaking of love, 
he writes: 
Let him give kingdoms of flowerleaves indifferently. There are persons from 
whom we always expect fairy-tokens; let us not cease to expect them. This is 
prerogative, and not to be limited by our municipal rules. For the rest I like to 
see that we cannot be bought and sold. The best of hospitality and of generos 
ity is also not in the will, but in fate. I find that I am not much to you; you do 
not need me; you do not feel me; then am I thrust out of doors, though you 
proffer me house and lands. No services are of any value, but only likeness. 
When I have attempted to join myself to others by services, it proved an intel 
lectual trick?no more. They eat your service like apples, and leave you out. 
But love them, and they feel you and delight in you all the time. (308) 
It seems that Emerson has retracted everything he has said earlier; the gift is 
made possible through love. If love obtains, then "kingdoms of flowerleaves" 
may be given indifferently; they are "fairy-tokens" because of their magical, 
ephemeral beauty, giving time and marking its breaks. Deliberate, calculated 
gifts are, like apples, devoured without thought of the giver. Love gives fruit 
and flowers as true gifts. It gives a break, but a break that is the effacement of 
any break. Love gives a break that is also a seamless, infinite whole. It offers an 
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endless "present," in the double sense of a gift and of a release from time, a 
break in time. The heightened language of this passage, in which love is per 
sonified as a god and his gifts are "fairy-tokens," suggests the fantastic dimen 
sion of all of this, the way in which the "present" in all of its senses is imaginary 
(if not impossible). If thinking the gift is in some sense thinking the impossible, 
that is marked by the way in which it leads us to think another form of the 
impossible, love. The essay "Love" begins by distinguishing actual and ideal 
love. If we want to "attain to that inward view of the law" of love "the first 
condition is, that we must leave a too close and lingering adherence to facts, and 
study the sentiment as it appeared in hope and not in history. For each man sees 
his own life defaced and disfigured, as the life of man is not, in his imagination" 
(98). If all things are possible with love, they are so only through the idealized 
love that is understood to surpass all of our experience. Emerson describes the 
memory of our loves as ineluctably painful: 
[E]ach man sees his own life defaced and disfigured, as the life of man is not, 
to his imagination. Each man sees over his own experience a certain stain of 
error, whilst that of other men looks fair and ideal. Let any man go back to 
those delicious relations which make the beauty of his life, which have given 
him sincerest instruction and nourishment, he will shrink and moan.... Every 
thing is beautiful seen from the point of the intellect, or as truth. But all is sour, 
if seen as experience. (98) 
In "Gifts," true gifts are shown to be impossible, unless they are given out of 
love. But a reading of the earlier essay "Love" demonstrates a difference be 
tween true love and our experiences of love that is analogous to that between 
true gifts and those sorry substitutes for them that make us uneasy at the holi 
days. Here it seems that the Platonic and Neoplatonic strain in Emerson's thought 
is at work in order to cast doubt on the value of the ordinary; the more glowing 
his description of the universal love of imagination becomes, the more limited 
and impotent the love of our experience and memory appears. 
This Platonizing tendency manifests itself in another floral discourse, one in 
which flowers again hint of another world. In "Gifts," they intimate the possi 
bility of a genuine gift; in this context, they suggest the possibility of a true love 
(perhaps another form of natural gift): 
The ancients called beauty the flowering of virtue. Who can analyze the name 
less charm which glances from one and another face and form? ... It is de 
stroyed for the imagination by any attempt to refer it to organization. Nor does 
it point to any relations of friendship or love known and described in society, 
but, as it seems to me, to a quite other and unattainable sphere, to relations of 
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transcendent delicacy and sweetness, to what roses and violets hint and fore 
show. (102) 
Here a Kantian conception of the beauty of flowers is wedded to a Platonic 
notion of love as the quest for beauty itself. Yet if "the ancients" spoke of "the 
flowering of virtue," they did not dwell, as do Kant and Emerson, on flowers 
themselves (indeed, at the analogous point in Socrates' discourse on love in the 
Symposium, he turns to discuss the beautiful faces and bodies of young men, 
something that might have been difficult for Emerson to speak of explicitly). It 
seems that the gift is not possible in the ordinary course of things; if there is to 
be a gift, it will arise from love. Yet love as we know it is a pale shadow of the 
true love that would make gifts possible. Without that love, we have flowers to 
remind us of its absence. 
Notes 
1. Nietzsche paraphrases Emerson's "Gifts" in The Gay Science when he writes, "Frankin 
cense.?Buddha says 'Do not flatter your benefactors.' Repeat this saying in a Christian church; 
right away it clears the air of everything Christian" (1974, ?142). 
2. Commenting on Mauss, Derrida asks, "Why must one begin with a poem when one speaks 
of the gift? And why does the gift always appear to be the gift of the poem, the don du poeme as 
Mallarme says?" (1992, 40). 
3. Nietzsche, at least in some writings, distances himself from the idea that we must always be 
paying our debts, that the world owes more than it can pay. He not only suspends it by means of the 
"it is said," but also has Zarathustra say in the chapter "Of Redemption" that it is madness that 
preaches such things. I am tempted to say that he attributes this madness to the Western philosophi 
cal tradition from Anaximander to Schopenhauer. And Heidegger, who takes issue with Nietzsche's 
translation of Anaximander's saying, does so in order to open up a possibility for thinking that the 
tradition has been cast into oblivion. In Specters of Marx (1994), Derrida suggests, in effect, that 
just as Hamlet is a revision of the revenge tragedy, a rewriting according to which there is some 
thing other than a simple cycle of injury, debt, and vengeance, so Heidegger's reinscription of the 
Anaximander saying is an attempt to read the history of thought as something other than a revenge 
tragedy, a story of how whatever emerges must perish in order to pay a debt. Hamlet, Heidegger, 
and Emerson are all concerned with the ontology of the gift; they ask, in one of Derrida's formula 
tions, "How does the concern with what there is to be intersect, in order perhaps to exceed it, with 
the logic of vengeance or right?" (1994, 23). The questions posed by Heidegger and Derrida might 
be paraphrased as, "Can we get a break from the cycle of debt and revenge?" 
4. See the Akadamie edition of Kant's works, pp. 207, 282, 291, 299, 323, 347, 349; the 
Akademie pagination is given in Pluhar's translation of Critique of Judgment (1987), which I have 
followed. 
5. Here Emerson's thought stands in contrast with Nietzsche and Bataille. In Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Zarathustra, upon receiving a staff with a golden handle, praises gold as symbolic of 
all gift-giving (see Nietzsche 1985, part 1, "On the Gift- Giving Virtue"). Bataille finds jewelry to 
be excessive and wasteful in a fashion that makes it an exemplary gift (1985, 119). 
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